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Abstract This paper  discusses possible  correspondences  between  neuroscientific 
findings and phenomenologically  informed  methodologies in the investigation of 
kinesthetic  empathy in watching dance.  Interest  in phenomenology   has recently 
increased in cognitive  science (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008) and dance scholars have 
recently contributed important new insights into the use of phenomenology in dance 
studies  (e.g. Legrand  and Ravn (Phenomenology  and the Cognitive Sciences  8 
(3):389–408,  2009); Parviainen  (Dance  Research  Journal  34(1):11–26,   2002); 
Rothfield (Topoi 24:43–53, 2005)). In vision research, coherent neural mechanisms 
for perceptual phenomena were uncovered, thus supporting  correlation  of phenom- 
enology and neurophysiology  Spillmann  (Vision  Research  49(12):1507–1521, 
2009). Correspondingly,  correlating subjects’ neurophysiological  data with qualita- 
tive responses  has been  proposed  as a means  to research the human brain in the 
study of consciousness (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008), with similar  issues in clinical 
psychology  Mishara (Current Opinion in Psychiatry  20(6):559–569,  2007) and 
biology Kosslyn et al. (American Psychologist  57:341–351,  2002). Yet  the 
relationship  between neuroscience and qualitative  research informed  by phenome- 
nology remains problematic. How qualitative  research normally  handles subjective 
experiences is difficult to reconcile with standard statistical  analysis of objective 
data. Recent technological  developments in cognitive  neuroscience have inspired  a 
number of  researchers  to use  more naturalistic  stimuli, outside  the laboratory 
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environment,  such as dance,  thereby  perhaps  helping to open up the cognitive 
sciences to more phenomenologically  informed  approaches. A question central to 
our research,  addressed  here, is how the phenomenal  experiences  of  a  dance 
audience  member,  as accessed by qualitative  research methods, can be related  to 
underlying neurophysiological   events.  We  outline below some methodological 
challenges encountered in relating audiences’ first-person accounts of watching live 
dance performance  to neurophysiological  evidence of their experiences. 
 
Keywords  Dance audience . Kinesthetic empathy . Phenomenological experience . 
Cognitive  neuroscience . Qualitative audience research 
 
 
Cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology and dance: questions of approach 
(introduction) 
 
Shared interest in dance 
 
A revival of interest in phenomenological analysis of dance (e.g. Legrand  and Ravn 
2009; Parviainen 2002; Rothfield 2005)  has coincided,  in the last decade, with the 
increased presence of dance in neuroscientific research. Most neuroscientific studies 
used dancers as experts (Jola and Mast 2005a) and/or dances as stimuli (e.g. Brown et 
al. 2006; Calvo-Merino  et al. 2005, 2006; Calvo-Merino  et al. 2006; Cross et al. 2006; 
Jola and Mast  2005b; MacFarlane  et  al.  2004) primarily  to investigate  processes 
involved in movement execution and observation. Generally, studies with a more 
phenomenological approach emphasise the first-person ‘lived’ experience of phenomena, 
such as the experience of what it is like to be a dance spectator,  while those with a 
neuroscientific approach have a more third-person  objective perspective such as trying 
to find out what processes implicitly occur in the brain when a person watches dance. 
In the literature to date related to investigating dance spectatorship, phenomenology  and 
neuroscience have mainly remained distinct rather than complementary. 
In the present paper, we discuss research processes and methods used to try to bridge 
the perceived  gap between these two approaches in an interdisciplinary  collaborative 
project. As neuroscientists and audience researchers informed  by phenomenological 
approaches,  we are  aiming to understand the relationship  between  experiences of 
audience members as described in the first person and the corresponding  neurophys- 
iological data. Due to the complexity of the stimuli and the diversity  of the audiences’ 
experiences, we cannot simply match the knowledge of elementary neural processes in 
visual perception  to the experience  of an  audience  member  watching a  dance 
performance in the theatre. How could we, for example, explain the very individual 
responses  to one  performance?  A  recently   published   essay by the  father of 
psychophysics,  Gustav Fechner (2009), using  introspection  provides  some insight 
into the intrinsic difficulty of matching experience to psychological processes. 
Our research specifically   explores  audiences’  responses  to live theatre  dance1 
using methods drawn from cognitive  neuroscience and qualitative audience research 
 
1 Theatre dance refers to dance as an art form, rather than social dance (and here it should be noted that the 
viewing conditions we are talking  about are those of Western theatre dance). 
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informed by phenomenology. We argue that while these fields carve out different 
and sometimes  incommensurable   areas of knowledge,  it is possible  to open up 
channels  of communication  between them, which can enrich our overall under- 
standing of spectators’  responses  to this significant art form, which is currently 
enjoying  a high profile on the UK cultural  scene. Styles of dance we refer to in this 
paper are bharatanatyam,  which is a classical  form of Indian dance, contemporary 
dance, and ballet. 
The neuroscientific focus on dance has been strongly  motivated  by a surge  of 
research outputs related to the identification  of so-called mirror neurons (Gallese et 
al. 1996). These neurons in the frontal and parietal cortices of monkey brain fire both 
when  a monkey  grasps for food as well as when  the monkey simply observes the 
experimenter executing the same grasping action. In the search for understanding the 
functional properties of equivalent neurons in the human brain, dance has proven to 
be a useful  tool. Dance enables neuroscience to study basic functional  properties of 
movement  observation  which include non-verbal  communication  and aesthetic 
appreciation different  to many goal and object-related  ‘everyday actions’, such  as 
grasping a cup, and sporting activities.  In some ways, spectators’ responses to dance, 
in particular motor simulation, can be assumed to be similar to those when watching 
other physical activities like gymnastics (Munzert et al. 2008) or basketball (Aglioti 
et al. 2008). However, theatre dance combines physical (athletic) components with 
artistic (aesthetic) values. Unlike competitive sports, gymnastics or athletics, or even 
competitive  dance (such as  ballroom competitions),  the quality of theatre  dance 
cannot be measured in terms of a ‘score’ by which one beats an opponent  (see also 
Friesen 1975). A theatre dance performance is a multifunctional socio-cultural event 
constituted  of  many diverse strands,  including the dancers,  the music that 
accompanies the movements, the costumes, the lighting, the set, the other audience 
members, and so on, that work together to impact on the spectator in the moment of 
watching. 
Certain attributes of theatre dance, such as the interaction of several modalities 
like music  and movement  and also the long duration of dance performances  (in 
contrast to  the  3-s presentation   duration of  stimuli   commonly used   in 
neuroscientific  experiments), make its use in scientific  experiments  problematic. 
Qualitative methods of audience research, informed by phenomenology,  are well 
placed to address some issues, although this approach can in turn be challenging 
for a neuroscientific  approach. For instance, qualitative  audience research 
emphasises describing   experience  in an  exploratory,  interactive  process  which 
takes place after, rather than during  the event and itself contributes to uncovering 
and  shaping  spectators’  experience.  Moreover, unlike neuroscience,  there  is  no 
clear-cut distinction between collecting and analysing data, as the methods (e.g. the 
questions asked in interviews) are already in themselves part of the analysis. This 
means that  each process is unrepeatable  and aims  to be valid on its  own terms 
rather than to provide  a predictive  model.  However,  audience research does not 
have  access to the brain functions studied by neuroscience. We feel that neither 
qualitative research nor neuroscience can present a complete  picture  of spectator 
response and  we  are interested  in combining  both first-person  experiences  and 
third-person neurophysiological data to explore spectators’ kinesthetic  responses to 
watching dance. 
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The collaborative  research project 
 
The work presented  here comes  out of a  collaborative   research  project called 
“Watching  Dance: Kinesthetic Empathy”,  funded in  the UK  by the Arts and 
Humanities  Research Council.  The project uses audience research and neuroscience 
to explore how dance spectators respond to and identify with dance based upon the 
assumption of the concept of kinesthetic empathy. The following essay addresses 
some questions emerging  from descriptive  data gathered in qualitative interviews 
with audience members and from data produced  by questionnaires, by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging  (fMRI) and by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS, 
see  “Dance  turns science  round and round”  section  for further methodological 
details), which were analysed quantitatively.  The crucial question for us was to what 
extent (if at all) do spectators of dance feel that they are emotionally and cognitively 
absorbed by and engaged in the movement  of the dancer(s)? And in terms of the 
methods employed  to answer  this question,  how might spectators’  experiences  as 
reported through qualitative audience research correspond to neurophysiological data as 
derived through fMRI and TMS? And in particular, what can we learn from combining 
these approaches that we could not discover by either method used separately? 
In  the  present  paper, our main aim is  to  argue for  the  importance   of 
interdisciplinary  collaboration, rather than to engage with the concept of kinesthetic 
empathy itself and the debates surrounding  it. However,   a brief overview of this 
topic will be useful  at this juncture. In dance research, the concept of kinesthetic 
empathy  has emerged to describe the response of some spectators when watching 
dance. Spectators frequently  report that even while sitting still, they feel they are 
participating  in the dance  they observe,  experiencing  movement  sensations and 
related feelings  and ideas. This type of response  has been described  in terms of 
kinesthesia (Daly 1992) and kinesthetic empathy (Hagendoorn 2004; Lipps 1906; 
Martin 1939), and was a major focus of our collaborative  research. The concept of 
kinesthetic  empathy as it has been discussed in dance studies is controversial, both in 
terms of how it is defined and how it has been regarded by scholars and critics.2  For 
some, it is integral to the experience of the ideal dance spectator, while others see it 
as falsely  universalist  (see discussion in Reason and Reynolds 2010). However, it is 
currently under the spotlight,  partly as  a  result of  the impetus  provided  by 
neuroscience research on ‘mirror neurons’, as mentioned  above. 
Some neuroscience researchers claim that there are brain areas in action 
observation linked with empathic responses (Keysers and Gazzola 2009). Empathy 
has  been  described   as “the  drive or ability  to attribute  mental  states to another 
person/animal,  and entails an appropriate  affective  response in the observer to the 
other person’s  mental  state”  (Baron-Cohen   and  Wheelwright  2004). Some 
researchers focus on the affective  rather than the cognitive  aspects of empathy and 
acknowledge  any form of affective  response as empathic,  whether  matching  the 
experience of another or showing  compassion for another, or simply any type of 
emotional response  (e.g. pleasure  at  somebody   else’s  pain).  Definitions  of 
kinesthesia  and proprioception   have a complex  history (see Foster  2008), but at 
least since  Sherrington’s  work  on the  ‘muscular  sense’  (Sherrington  1907), 
 
2 See for instance Foster (2008); Järvinnen (2007), McFee (1992). 
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proprioception (or kinaesthesia) is widely accepted in modern cognitive psychology 
as a distinct  multicomponent  sensory modality,  often referred to as the sixth sense 
(Wade 2003).3 Many studies of proprioception and kinaesthesia  involve angle or 
position matching,  or balance  tests.  Examining the role of motor simulation  in 
affective empathy is, however, novel. 
Neurophysiological approaches have the advantage  of measurement at the 
moment  of the activity of watching  dance. However,  the popular  neuroimaging 
techniques which enable study of the functional role of cortical  areas have spatial 
and temporal restrictions which make it impossible to expose participants to real life 
dance events. Therefore, even if one agrees with Zeki (2002) in theory, that there is a 
neurobiological network responsible for the spectator’s response, in practise, we may 
not be able to explain it at this point in time by the use of a single  methodological 
approach.  As mentioned  above,  dance is more than complex  abstract movement 
sequences  of 3-s in front of a  blue background,   as it is frequently  presented in 
neuroscience studies. In our research, we wanted to try to maintain the variables of 
performance,  such as costume, music,  and longer  duration. 
The diversity of dance  theatre  aesthetics  and the  wide  range  of subjective 
preferences prompted  us to study individual differences in spectators’ experience 
when watching dance  and  to explore  links with  their neuronal  activity.  For 
instance,  we  measured  how the  visual  experience  of watching dance  affected 
different dance spectators’  verbal  and neurophysiological  responses  to watching 
their preferred, familiar style  as compared  to a novel, unfamiliar style  of dance 
(Jola et al. 2011, Enhanced motor cortex excitability induced by watching dance in 
emphatic and visually experienced  dance  spectators,  under  review;  see  also 
Grosbras et al.  2010; Jola  et al.  2011). In brief, we found evidence  that motor 
simulation,  which we related  to kinesthetic  experience,  was  modified by both 
visual  expertise  and  by the  spectators’  empathic  abilities. However, the link 
between  motor simulation and  empathic  responses remains  hypothetical.   The 
simultaneous  occurrence in some individuals  of kinesthetic  sensation and motor 
simulation  was the only evidence of their relatedness.  Similarly,  we cannot yet 
conclude whether enhanced empathic abilities led to enhanced empathic responses. 
“Watching Dance: Kinesthetic Empathy” thus faces at least two methodological 
challenges. First, investigating   dance as a live art form represents  a difficulty for 
conventional  neuroscience research in particular due to time constraints  (dance lasts 
much longer than conventional experimental stimuli) and less rigorously  controlled 
stimuli (dance is multilayered).  Second, linking spectators’ experiences with their 
neuronal underpinnings  challenges qualitative  audience research in terms of the need 
to generalise across individual experiences in order to make the findings  comparable 
with neuroscientific results. 
 
 
3 Proprioception  and kinesthesia  are  often   used  interchangeably   but often and more specifically, 
proprioception is used to describe static limb position sense while kinesthesia is used to refer to the 
sensation of movement of one’s own body. The sensory experiences of position  and movement derive 
from signals from several classes of receptors, including  those in the muscles, joints, and skin (Proske and 
Gnadevia 2009). How information from different receptors is integrated in the human brain to a coherent 
multisensory  experience is still an open question. Together  with other sensory modalities, in particular 
vision, proprioception has become a useful way to investigate how the body might be mentally represented 
(Graziano and Botvinick 2002). 
 
 
 
Author's personal copy  
 
Reference:  
Jola C, Ehrenberg S, Reynolds D. (2012) 'The experience of watching dance: 
phenomenological-neuroscience duets'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 
11 (1), pp. 17-37. 
 
 
 
Dance turns science round and round 
 
Why research on watching dance differs from existing  neuroscience research 
on visual motion perception 
 
In  visual perception   research,  how neuronal  processes  give rise to a  unified 
experiential  perception of objects or events has been investigated  for over half a 
century (Spillmann  2009). In particular,  scientists have found neurophysiological 
mechanisms that are indispensable in the explanation of such visual percepts. Quite a 
large number of these are related to the ways in which we perceive motion visually, 
such as grouping  by coherent motion,4  apparent motion,5  or our extraordinary ability 
in biological  motion perception.6  For instance, grouping of coherent motion  has been 
described as the most powerful  example of a correlation  between neurophysiological 
findings  and perceptual experience (Spillmann  1999, p. 1479). An example of such 
grouping is when a circle of regularly  spaced dots within a field of random dots can 
be perceived  in the instant they start moving coherently.  This so-called pop-out 
effect  has been explained  by selective neuronal activity for coherent motion in the 
visual areas (V1 and MT) of the monkey’s brain (for details see Spillmann  2009). 
Also, some scientists are working bi-directionally, which means that they are not just 
studying  neural correlates of perceptual illusions,  but they also create perceptual 
illusions based  on their understanding  of perceptual  mechanisms.  This is a  rare 
approach;  but if successful, it allows an experiential  way of evaluating scientific 
models of perception.7  In sum, in visual perception research, the descriptions of the 
experiences of perceptual illusions  and the neurophysiological  data gathered during 
the perceptual   processes  have been  successfully   complementing   each  other.8 
 
4 The perception of a coherent motion can be the result of a combination  of several different motion vectors. 
For example, when two grating patterns that shift into different directions are superimposed onto each other, the 
resulting percept can be that of one coherent moving plaid pattern (see Adelson and Movshon 1982). 
5 Apparent motion describes the phenomenon of perceiving motion when there is none. For instance, when a 
stationary object is presented first in one position, and then, after a short black out another identical object is 
shown at another location instead, the observer has the impression of seeing one single object move from one 
place to the other instead of two alternately presented objects, as first described in Exner (1875). 
6 Any form of perceived motion derived from human or animal movements can be described as biological 
motion. The term is mostly  used, however, to describe a unique  form of presentation, by a handful  of 
moving dots only (see  Fig. 1). Interesting about the perception of biological motion is that human 
observers are particularly  sensitive to its spatio-temporal  parameters (see Johansson 1973). 
7 See examples  of created illusions  on http://www.neuralcorrelate.com/ 
8 A similar approach  can be  seen  in choreography:  the question  is sometimes   posed  as to whether 
neuroscience findings could contribute to choreographic decision making. One way to link neuroscientific 
findings with productive  creation  can be found in Hagendoorn (2010, forthcoming).  By the use of an 
imaginary choreography,  the author considers  where cognitive neuroscience  can be  linked with the 
elements of a dance  work. This knowledge could be used by dance spectators to reflect on their own 
responses  as well as by choreographers and dancers to understand how artistic decisions might affect the 
spectators’  responses. Also, attempts  have been made to create dance works based on neuroscientific 
findings or experimental  approaches (Hansen and Barton  2009; see also Jola 2010).  However,  this is a 
very complex issue. To date, we do not know enough about the multitude of sensory interactions that lead 
to the audiences’ experience when watching dance which could then be used for choreographic practice. 
There  are clearly enormous  differences  between choreographing  a dance work and creating perceptual 
illusions for scientific study. We may be able post hoc to infer the contribution of perceptual properties to 
effects of artistic work (Melcher  and Bacci 2008); but (un-)fortunately, it is not simple to use modern 
neuroscientific methods for artistic creation (for an example, Goebel 2008). 
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However, several factors distinguish this type of research from studying audiences’ 
experience of watching  dance. 
In visual perception research, the approach is confined to the study of mostly low- 
level visual perceptual  mechanisms  (which means early  in the process  of visual 
perception)  whereas watching  dance involves  processes which culminate at higher 
levels of perception.  Also, in contrast  to the diverse  complex strands  we have 
referred to in the context of watching  dance, the engagement with the stimuli in 
research into low-level perception is often limited to visual aspects of percepts in the 
form of a perceptual   illusion which is perceived  consistently  across many 
participants. Finally, the stimuli used to study visual perception  are predominantly 
controlled  with precise millisecond  timing, and retraceable  to an  experimentally 
controlled  event. A good example is the immediate  response of a neuron  in the 
visual cortex to a  light being switched  on-and-off   as shown  by Jung et al. (see 
Spillmann 1999, p. 1462). Watching dance, however, is not based on a single  clear 
indicative event such as  switching on-and-off  of sensory stimulation.   Dance  is 
multimodal  and ephemeral, and since no two performances of the same work are 
identical, reproducibility is limited and conducting   a  scientific experiment  is a 
challenge. 
Due to the complexity of  the stimuli and the diversity of  the audiences’ 
experiences, we cannot simply match the knowledge of elementary neural processes 
in visual perception to the experience  of an audience  member  watching   a dance 
performance in the theatre. While visual and notably  auditory  information  are the 
main sensory stimulations  the spectator is engaged with, what is interesting about 
dance (and other art forms) is that they bring together experiences on different levels, 
e.g. perceptual,  emotional,  and  cognitive. Research  in  visual perception  rarely 
connects  the visual phenomena with diverse levels of individual experience and 
generally   uses reduced  stimuli with short presentation  times  that do not allow 
individual processes  based  on extended  time exposure  to kick in (Hasson et al. 
2008). Hence,  any researcher  seriously investigating  audiences’  engagement  in 
watching dance   has  to  deal  with  manifold phenomenological   descriptions  or 
neuronal/behavioural responses. 
 
The evolution of ‘naturalistic’ stimuli in cognitive neuroscience 
 
The experimental  setup classically   used  in  cognitive neuroscience  consists  of 
manipulating  a couple  of features of a particular  predominantly  visual or auditory 
stimulus, in order to identify the effect of one feature upon another with a certain 
statistical  significance  and power. This approach  has  provided   much scientific 
insight into many areas, beyond human perception. However,  the inferences made 
from such highly controlled  approaches are not necessarily transferrable to complex 
situations. In other words, the ‘artificial’ experiments have little in common with the 
‘real world’. We have outlined some of the issues below. 
There  has been previous  criticism in scientific fields of studies whose models 
were based on reductionist  approaches (e.g. Dehaene 1989). An example of change 
of stimulus complexity in experimental  research is illustrated in Fig. 1. Graphical 
displays with a number  of simplified objects or letters as illustrated  in the upper row 
of Fig. 1 were frequently  used by experimental psychologists to test their models of 
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[photo here] 
Fig. 1  Examples of experimental stimuli used in scientific  research from pop-out feature detection to 
motion  perception,  and a scene from a piece that an audience may see (from top left clockwise). Figures 
by Austin Mcwiggin (feature integration, wikipedia project), Corinne Jola (artificially created point-light 
display), Scottish Ballet (Gregory Dean as the French Prince, Jarkko Lehmus as The King, Eve Mutso as 
The Queen, Tama Barry as the Russian Prince and Christopher  Harrison  as the Austrian  Prince in Page’s 
The Sleeping Beauty. Photograph by Andrew  Ross). Please see online publication  for colour effects 
 
 
perception and attention.  Treisman and Gelade (1980),  for example, verified their 
feature-integration  theory (i.e. complex visual scenes  are  perceived   via single 
features which are then combined in a second step) against the Gestalt account (i.e. a 
complex  visual scene is perceived as a whole  or ‘gestalt’ which can then be dissected 
into its components)  by means  of similar stimuli. Also, the study of biological 
motion perception  mostly involves short movement   sequences.  These  are  often 
presented in the form of point light displays, as shown in the middle row of Fig. 1, in 
order to remove any visual information  that may interfere with the research question 
or just add noise to the data (Pollick et al. 2010). However, the visual scene a dance 
spectator is exposed to is rarely that simple. An audience member may—from  a 
good seat—see several dancers, involved  in different  actions, as well as moving  in 
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synchrony  as shown at the bottom of Fig. 1, all of which are part of the experience of 
watching dance.  And importantly, the inferences  made from highly controlled 
approaches   as  exemplified above are  not necessarily  transferrable  to complex 
situations. In particular,  recent studies showed that the complexity of experimental 
stimuli does affect visual and auditory perception (Cook and Van Valkenburg 2009). 
As one might expect, in the vast majority  of published studies that used ‘dance’ to 
investigate  neurophysiological   processes, the movement  sequences have not yet 
reached  the full  potential required  to study the multiple levels  involved when 
watching  theatre dance. The stimuli used in empirical neuroscientific  studies differ 
from stimuli experienced outside the lab environment on several  levels. For one, 
simple, constrained  stimuli have an  artificially reduced  number  of variables.  A 
reasonable number of studies investigating human motion do present a movie  of the 
full  human  body in motion but control for factors  such as  face recognition  by 
blurring the face of the performer (e.g. Calvo-Merino  et al. 2006). Also, in most 
neuroscientific  studies, the combinations  of features  are limited. For example, in 
most experimental studies, movements are performed  in neutral clothing, presented 
in front of a monotonous two-dimensional  background without music. However, in 
‘real-life’, dance frequently plays with sound, costume, and light effects. Finally, the 
time is constrained, ranging from presentations in the millisecond  range in vision 
perception  research to a few seconds in neuroscientific  studies on motor control. 
We recognise that these previous  studies were important  to the development of 
dance  and neuroscience  collaborations   and using simplified stimuli is still  an 
accepted  way to study human cognitive and emotional   processes. After half a 
century of increasingly proficient reductionist   approaches, however,  a number  of 
cognitive neuroscientists   are  eager  to develop  methods  that allow experimental 
investigation by means of so-called ‘natural’ stimuli (Hasson et al. 2004; Wade and 
Bruce 2001). 
 
Complex  data in qualitative research 
 
For our purposes, the research  has to engage with dance  as a Western  theatre  art 
form, unconstrained by laboratory  conditions  and presented as an art form to theatre- 
going spectators,  thereby raising  questions  of  aesthetics  (e.g. judgment/taste, 
pleasure).  If  studying complex, unpredictable   data  presents  difficulties  for 
neuroscience,  this is precisely the forte  of  qualitative research  methodologies. 
Qualitative  research is concerned with the various ways in which the social world is 
‘interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted’ (Mason 2002a, p. 3). 
It emerges from different traditions and disciplines in the human and social sciences 
and encompasses a variety  of methods related to divergent disciplinary approaches 
and philosophies.  The main methods  associated  with  qualitative research   are 
ethnography/participant   observation;  qualitative interviewing; focus groups; 
language-based approaches (such as discourse analysis);  collection  and analysis of 
documents and texts, and visual  methods. Within this methodological variety there 
are  common strands  which distinguish qualitative research  from perspectives 
commonly  associated with cognitive  science. Most obviously,   a large  amount  of 
research  in the cognitive sciences  is ‘quantitative’,  with outcomes  that can be 
expressed numerically.   Qualitative   researchers, by contrast, maximise  the depth, 
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complexity and nuance  provided by the data. Although it  may involve some 
quantification,  this is not regarded as central.  Importantly,   audience research is 
concerned that meaning would be lost if data were reduced to numbers. In qualitative 
research, there  is a  two-way relationship  between researcher and data where  the 
researcher aims to learn from the data. 
 
“All  qualitative methods   seek  to  discover understanding  or  to  achieve 
explanation from the data instead of from (or in addition to) prior knowledge 
or theory. Thus the goals always include learning from, and doing justice to, 
complex data, and in order to achieve such understanding, the researcher needs 
ways of exploring complexity.” (Richards and Morse 2007, p. 2). 
 
This means that the qualitative   researcher needs to be flexible and to adopt  a 
critical, reflexive approach to the research process.9 The methods of generating data 
can be adapted to changing ‘real life’ contexts, and to changes in the researcher’s 
approach generated by the data. The integration  of collection  and analysis is seen in 
itself as a major strength of qualitative inquiry (Richards and Morse 2007, p. 1). This 
unremitting  adaptation of question,  data and analysis means that each case is quite 
specific and is not reproducible. However, reproducibility  is not necessary, as by the 
same token,  qualitative  research does not set out to produce predictive statements. 
The aim is to provide descriptions of and insights into specific  cases, which  may be 
informed by, and in  turn inform, conceptualisations  or  theories.  Descriptions 
produced in this way are sometimes  described  as ‘thick’, a term  originally used by 
Ryle (1949), meaning that they incorporate considerable detail and depth. Although 
the outcomes  of  qualitative research  may not be  immediately transferable  or 
predictive, if the descriptions are sufficiently  ‘thick’, others will be able to evaluate 
the extent to which the conclusions  are transferable to different contexts. 
 
Complex  data in cognitive neuroscience 
 
The cognitive  sciences have always aimed at being able to make predictions about 
perceptual, emotional  or cognitive  processes that are valid in the real world. This 
proves particularly challenging  in  the case  of  dance,  with its high degree  of 
complexity,  as well as the effects of liveness (no two performances  are the same or 
seen in the same context).  Indeed, one may doubt whether it is possible at all to 
make consistent statements about the perceptual, emotional and cognitive  processes 
associated with dance as seen from a phenomenological  perspective. 
In general, with advances in brain imaging technology it has been increasingly 
viable to relate brain activity with experimentally driven studies of participants’ 
individual, subjective   evaluations   and  responses.  Such  an  approach  can  add 
substantial information to the brain data and can be either predictive (e.g. effect 
of independent  varied  stimuli  features  on the  dependent  measures)  or reversed 
(enhanced brain activity is traced back to the event in the stimuli). Calvo-Merino 
et al.  (2008) related  the brain  activity  of naïve observers when  watching  dance 
 
 
9 
“Reflexivity in this sense means thinking critically about what you are doing and why, confronting and 
often challenging your own assumptions, and recognising the extent to which your thoughts, actions and 
decisions shape how you research and what you see” (Mason 2002a, p. 5). 
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movements to their consensus preference ratings. However,  little attention has been 
paid to linking brain activity with individual experiential awareness in the field of 
movement observation.  This may be partly due to technological limitations of fMRI. For 
instance, with EEG (electroencephalogram) and TMS,  functional  processing can be 
identified in the human brain in the range of milliseconds whereas fMRI has a higher 
spatial (in the range of few millimetres) but lower temporal resolution (in the range of 
seconds). By means of TMS,  researchers can trigger the motor cortex of a participant  at 
a particular  time-point  and they will know exactly what the participant was shown in 
relation to the data measured. In fMRI, brain activity analysis is restricted to the time it 
takes to scan the brain  areas of interest, which is usually around 1–3-s. Therefore, if 
using more complex stimuli,  several events are combined  into one signal. In some 
studies, the participants’ feedback is nevertheless required to identify  the underlying 
processes of the brain activity  measured. This is for example  the case in terms of 
research  on consciousness where  the  participants’ state  of mind is the  subject  of 
investigation.  One of the  main topics in these studies  is ‘change  blindness’  (e.g. 
Simons and Chabris 1999; see also Simons and Rensink 2005), where the participant 
is not aware  of  what is in  front of  him. This raises  interesting   questions  for 
phenomenological  approaches, as the participants’ descriptions may not correspond to 
the actual stimulation.  In our research, we are not questioning the spectators’ reports, 
or that they ‘miss out on one thing or another’. What the spectator experiences is what 
we want to know. This approach informed our neurophysiological  design in the way 
we ignored—to  a certain degree—issues of stimulus complexity but instead focused 
on differences between audience members. This allowed  us the freedom to evaluate 
our measures of cortical excitability without defining a precise physical  event. 
 
The qualitative lens 
We have suggested that qualitative  research can complement some of the limitations 
of neuroscience, and have indicated  that our approach is informed by phenomenol- 
ogy. This means that we focus on dance spectatorship as lived,  embodied experience, 
on which research  participants   are invited to actively reflect. Rather  than being 
abstracted and decontextualised,  the experience of watching dance is connected with 
the spectator’s ‘lifeworld’: “Phenomenology attempts to explicate the meanings  as 
we live them in our everyday existence, our lifeworld.” (Van Manen 1990, p.11). To 
date, academic empirical research on Western theatre dance audiences is extremely 
rare, and  existing research  leans towards approaches  informed by  cognitive 
psychology  rather than qualitative  methods (Hanna 1983; Glass 2005; Glass and 
Stevens 2005).  While a small but growing body of qualitative  research on theatre 
audiences exists (Reason 2010a,b, 2006a,b; Sauter 2000; Schoenmakers 1990), our 
approach is pioneering in the context of dance audiences.  Our audience research 
activities  take the form of interactions (usually but not always verbal), which take 
place after the performance,  and therefore  effectively deal  with memories  and 
reflections  rather than with the experience  of watching as  it takes  place in the 
moment. Reason writes, for instance, about his research with young audiences: “in 
bringing participatory enquiry and phenomenology together one major objective was 
to invite the young audience  members  to reflect upon their experience  and the 
construction of that experience through memory” (Reason 2010a,b, p. 133). 
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To date, hermeneutical phenomenology has been the most influential strand in 
phenomenologically informed audience research. Hermeneutical phenomenology empha- 
sises the  role of conscious reflection  and also the use of language  as part of lived 
experience  (e.g. Van  Manen  1990). Indeed,  no experience  can  be  accessed or 
communicated without some form of mediation.  Van  Manen  states that because  “a 
person cannot  reflect on lived experience  while living  through the experience”, 
phenomenological reflection is therefore “not introspective but retrospective”. Reflection 
on lived experience is always recollective; it is reflection on experience that is already 
passed or lived through (Van Manen 1990, p. 10). From this point of view, a spectator’s 
‘experience’ of the performance is not located solely in what takes place while they are 
watching, but encompasses re-construction   and interpretation  through subsequent 
reflection in social contexts, which can include  activities  such as interviews and focus 
groups.  Rather  than purely personal  and private,  experience is treated  as  socially 
mediated. Audiences are considered as active agents in constituting the meaning of the 
performance through articulating their experiences. In describing  and discussing their 
responses to dance performances, the spectators we dialogue with have the opportunity 
to tease out what they themselves consider to be important  about what they have seen. It 
is interesting  to note that Glass  (2005) found in  her  research  on audiences  of 
contemporary  dance that experiences of dance, and also pre-performance  information 
sessions, had relatively  little impact on response, whereas audiences derived  pleasure 
from post-performance discussions and enjoyed being asked their opinion  and giving 
their interpretations of the work. This led her to hypothesise that “Perhaps it is not pre- 
performance information that is important, but the observers’ opportunity to reflect on 
their interpretation, understanding and connection with the piece” (p. 120). 
There is a  strong tradition linking the study of dance  and phenomenology 
(Fraleigh  1987; Sheets-Johnstone 1980). These earlier writings  have been critiqued 
for their universalist  approach to lived, embodied dance experience (e.g. Legrand 
and Ravn 2009), and Rothfield (2005) has  argued  for the need  to extend  the 
phenomenological   approach  to include corporeal  specificity and to differentiate 
dance  experience  “according  to its social, historical and kinaesthetic  milieux” 
(p. 44). She  advocates  a ‘pluralization of the lived body’ and argues that 
phenomenology  should’recast‘the  lived body as  lived bodies.  With its empirical 
base and its strong links with the social sciences, qualitative   audience research is 
ideally placed to counter universalism. This can mean approaching interview  data in 
a  number   of ways, diversifying the traditional phenomenological   approach,  by 
endeavouring to take account of factors such as race, gender, and cultural  capital. 
 
 
Our duet 
 
An approach to studying spectators’ kinesthetic empathy using TMS and qualitative 
audience interviews 
 
Thus far, we have outlined the interdisciplinary  qualitative and  quantitative 
approaches  that are  being employed  in our research  and indicated  some of the 
broader  methodological  and epistemological  issues  of our collaboration.  In this 
section, we illustrate ways in which we have attempted to link our disciplines by 
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means of a  study which combined  methodologies  of cognitive neuroscience and 
qualitative interviews informed by phenomenology. 
For the study in question, volunteers watched three live solo performances: one short 
dance piece in the style of ballet, one in the style of bharatanatyam,  and a non-dance acting 
performance (without voice).10  The aim of this study was to explore neuronal correlates 
of visual expertise in watching  dance. Previous studies showed that a putative  mirror 
neuron network  is more strongly  activated for actions that were  shared between  the 
observer  and the performer,  such as when  expert  dancers watched  dance movements 
they were physically familiar with (e.g. Calvo-Merino  et al. 2005). This seminal study, 
however, did not differentiate  between  visual and  motor experience  or measure the 
spectators’ response by any means other than the neuronal activity in the form of the 
BOLD (blood oxygenation level dependent) signal. Following on subsequent studies 
(e.g. Calvo-Merino  et al. 2009), which explored visual and motor experience, our aim 
was to ascertain  what, if any,  was the impact of different degrees  of viewing-only 
experience in each style on the viewers’ neurophysiological response. This was 
evaluated by examining cortex excitability induced with TMS and by exploring data 
produced  through  qualitative  audience research (see below).  To separate visual from 
motor expertise, we only measured participants  who had no physical  dance training. 
Roughly, a  third of the participants  were experienced  spectators  of ballet but not 
bharatanatyam,  and a third were experienced spectators of bharatanatyam but not ballet, 
while the remainder  had no experience in watching  either. As  argued above, it was 
important that the experiment corresponded as closely as possible to the ‘normal’ setting of 
the experience. Hence, the performers were professionals in each style, dressed in full 
costume,  and danced  a solo  of 4.5 min to style-specific  recorded music. This is an 
unconventional setting for both neuroscientific experiments as well as qualitative audience 
research (see also “Conclusions: situating  experience across disciplines” section). 
 
The TMS experiment 
 
For the neuroscience research, we assessed cortical excitability as a sign of how much the 
audience was engaged with the performance. In general terms, the threshold for moto- 
corticospinal  excitability  is reduced when  the subject is  engaged  with observing  or 
executing  a  movement,   e.g.  during motor imagery,  action  observation,  and  motor 
preparation.11  In this experiment,  participants’  responses were  measured while  they 
were watching a live performance. The point of measure was clear and reproducible, 
but nonetheless  movement   selective.  In  other words,  the participants’  cortical 
 
10 We chose to compare the spectators’ responses to watching  ballet and bharatanatyam  because these are 
discrete styles with well-defined  vocabularies, by contrast with contemporary  dance, which frequently 
combines  elements of different styles.  For a  recording   of each  performance   as staged  in the TMS 
experiment  please see http://paco.psy.gla.ac.uk/project.php?id=13. 
11 Cortex excitability is indicated by the size of the amplitude of a motor evoked potential induced by 
single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation  (TMS, see Fadiga  et al. 1995). A number of magnetic 
stimulations  were triggered  over the participants’  left motor cortex while they were watching the 
performance. The magnetic field induces an electric volley in the brain which evokes the neurons to send 
signals down the axons to move, in the form of action potentials comparable to when the participant would 
move voluntarily. This method is not invasive or painful. If the moto-corticospinal excitability  is high, the 
amplitude of a TMS induced motor evoked potential on the right hand or arm contralateral to the site of 
the stimulation  is larger, and vice versa. 
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excitability was measured every 8-s with a random jitter of between zero and 2-s a total 
of 30 times.  Hence,  at first,  we  ignored  which particular  type  of movement  the 
performer executed  at each time point of the TMS trigger. This experiment  was not 
designed to control systematically for particular movements within each style for each 
trial. Nevertheless, each style has a systematic movement style. Since we do know that 
our individuals were different in their visual experience and they would experience 
individual levels of enjoyment, we focused on correlating their subjective responses 
with differences in neurophysiological data (for detailed methods please see Jola et al. 
2011, Enhanced motor cortex excitability  induced by watching dance in emphatic and 
visually experienced dance spectators, under review;  see also Grosbras et al. 2010). 
The experiment showed that the excitability of the cortex of spectators who have 
previous visual experience in watching ballet is higher when they watch ballet than any 
of the other performance forms, with which they were less familiar. This was not the 
case for either the control group or the experienced bharatanatyam spectators (whose 
level of experience  was  less consistent).12    We  also  found statistically  significant 
correlations between the participants’ levels of empathic abilities and their response to 
watching dance: participants who scored higher on empathy13  showed higher cortical 
excitability than  those who scored  low (Jola et al. 2011, Enhanced  motor cortex 
excitability induced by watching  dance in emphatic and visually experienced dance 
spectators,  under  review). However, these results  were based  on comparing  the 
responses to the different styles by different groups of participants (those who scored 
high or low on empathy,  those  who were visually  experienced or inexperienced 
spectators of ballet or bharatanatyam, or novices in both forms), rather than comparing 
data between individual  subjects. So-called case studies could  be pursued (i.e. Kosslyn 
et al. 2002) but we have yet to define valid scientific selection criteria to single out 
individuals as case studies  from the 32 participants. 
 
The qualitative interviews 
 
For the audience  research, each subject  participated  (after watching the perform- 
ances) in a semi-structured  interview,  i.e. an interview which uses certain  pre-set 
questions, but where the order can be varied and the interviewer  can also respond to 
directions suggested by the interlocutor’s response (see Mason 2002b). We used this 
interview  method because we did not want to be confined  by our own questions, 
which would inevitably influence interviewees’  responses.  The emphasis was on 
encouraging  participants  to describe  freely what they had seen  or felt and  their 
responses to it. However, the interviews were also themed around certain questions, 
such as  identifying parts of the performance participants  particularly  liked. The 
number of themes and responses were rich and complex,  as one would hope and 
expect in qualitative research.  Some participants  said that they felt they were 
responding in their face to the facial expression of the dancer, such as focusing  on 
the bharatanatyam dancer’s smile, and also that they valued the physical closeness to 
the dancer which resulted from the small performance  space, as opposed to the less 
 
 
12 Owing to the difficulty of recruiting experienced bharatanatyam spectators in Glasgow,  these spectators 
were less experienced than the ballet spectators. 
13 We used the Interpersonal Reactivity Index by Davis (1980). 
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intimate environment of a theatre. In sum, from asking about embodied response we 
also learned  about what made the performances  enjoyable  for each  individual 
spectator and made them feel involved (or not). 
To facilitate qualitative interview  analysis categories were devised using QSR NVivo 
8,14 starting off with themes which were anticipated through our research questions 
such  as ‘familiarity’  and  ‘unfamiliarity’,  ‘connection  to dancer’,  ‘desire  to move’, 
‘emotional  response’,  and  ‘embodied  response’.  We  noted that the  majority of 
experienced ballet spectators expressed high levels of enjoyment from the ballet and 
their responses frequently   came into the categories of desiring to move, feeling a 
connection  to dancer,  and  having  an emotional  response  to the  performance.  By 
contrast, people who enjoyed the performance less made very few references to these 
categories. Moreover,  detailed  analysis of the interview material, known as  ‘thick 
description’ (see above), also prompted  us to add new categories, such as ‘admiration 
of virtuosity’,  ‘evaluation  of quality’  and  even  ‘can’t  remember’.  The  latter was 
because  lack of  familiarity or  understanding  sometimes  made it  difficult  for 
participants to take in or remember much of what they had seen. Another  category 
that we added was ‘motivation’ as it became evident that what the participants were 
looking for in a dance performance had a huge effect on how they responded to what 
they saw. This impacted on our understanding of the original  research questions. 
 
Spectators’ enhanced excitability 
 
Whereas we had started out to explore the importance of familiarity in terms of viewing 
experience, people’s responses underlined for us the importance of wider factors relating 
to cultural competence, as described by Bourdieu (1984): “A work of art has meaning 
and interest  only for someone who possesses the  cultural competence,  that is, the 
code, into which it is encoded. [...] A beholder who lacks the specific code feels lost in 
a chaos of sounds and rhythms, colours and lines, without rhyme or reason.” (p. 3). By 
the same token, an individual’s general disposition to consume and seek exposure to 
certain kinds of things is not random or even necessarily wholly self-aware but instead 
deeply  ingrained  into embodied  cultural practises  and  their associated social  and 
economic  conditions  (see Reason and Reynolds  2010). While the audience research 
provided examples which corroborated the TMS findings about the effects of visual 
expertise on movement simulation,  it also emphasised the aspect of enjoyment and 
brought into play factors of cultural  experience and motivations,  as it was not only 
what the  participants   had  seen  of  a  given dance  style  (their  level of  viewing 
experience), but also their preconceived/culturally  received  ideas about it and their 
personal preferences or motivations which affected how they experienced it.15 
 
 
14 NVivo software is designed to facilitate  qualitative  researchers in analysing unstructured data, without 
relying on statistics or numbers.  See http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx. 
15 This complements previous studies in cognitive neuroscience. For instance, Molnar-Szakacs et al. (2007) 
found that motor cortex excitability of the spectator is enhanced when they observed culturally coded hand 
gestures performed by an actor of their own linguistic, regional or cultural community. However, their study 
was about the effects of cultural learning on social communication in everyday situations, and did not relate 
cortical excitability  to personal  preference.  As  indicated  by qualitative   audience  research as well as 
neuroscientific data, our study showed enhanced cortical excitability when the observed movements matched 
the spectators’ expectations and aesthetic appreciations. 
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Matching different ways of representing kinesthetic empathy 
 
Our question  in the next part of the research  was: what is the correspondence 
between  the data from the neuroscience  research  for each  individual’s  average 
responses to the three performances and their experiences as reported verbally  in the 
interviews? In particular, we were interested to find out whether stronger responses 
as measured through  TMS  corresponded  to stronger  kinesthetic  responses and/or 
levels of enjoyment  as articulated through interviews.  If we were to find participants’ 
described experiences reflected  in their neurophysiological   responses, would the 
explanatory  gap between cognitive  neuroscience and qualitative  audience research 
be narrowed?  However,  while attempting to match individual verbal reports with 
individual cortical excitability,  we reminded ourselves that this is not much different 
from the psychological  phenomenon of pareidolia, i.e. seeing a random  stimulus  as 
being  significant,   as it often is described by the example of seeing figures  in the 
clouds. How can we see the connection  between the data gathered without over- 
interpreting? The human  perceptual  system acts in a creative  manner  (see “Data 
turns science round and round” section above), so if we tried to match  a subject’s 
verbal report with the neurophysiological data, we might identify  some connections, 
but at the risk of a bias. Thus, the best way to reduce the chances of this risk, from a 
neuroscientific  perspective, would be a ‘blind review’ in form of a researcher  who 
was kept uninformed  about the studies’ aims. 
Hence,  similar to an inter-rater  reliability test, a  former student  who had no 
experience  with this study was paid to match both types of data, i.e. cortical 
excitability with verbal reports. First, she was asked to find the neurophysiological 
responses to each performance  that belong to the same individual.16 Clearly,  these 
data were from the same individual,  and should therefore be related, however, if the 
movements between hand and arm were different  at any time point of the randomly 
applied triggers between  the three types of performances  observed  (which we 
hypothesised)  the data could only be  matched  according  to overall individual 
characteristics (such as the subjects’ average level, when high empathic abilities give 
higher cortex excitability independent  of the movement  observed).  Second,  the 
student was asked to select a few salient audience research transcripts  and find the 
corresponding  data. However,  as expected, her task was a very difficult one, if not 
impossible: of all participants, the cortical excitability of the hand and arm were 
matched correctly  for one participant  only. This means that she  was not able to 
identify one person’s data, i.e. matching graphs of the hand (as measured during the 
bharatanatyam performance) to the arm (as measured during the ballet performance). 
This is not surprising,   as the location of the measure,  the embodiment,  varied 
between different  types of performances  (in ballet, expressive  gestures emphasise 
arm  movements,  while in bharatanatyam  they emphasise  finger movements). 
Interestingly, of the incorrectly  matched data, the student matched  six out of 11 
ballet spectators with other ballet spectators, three out of ten novices, and none out 
of eight experienced bharatanatyam spectators. It seems thus that the student’s naïve 
matching corresponds with the scientific  observation, namely, that the responses of 
 
16 We measured motor  evoked responses in the finger and the arm, and therefore, each subject had two 
averaged graphs, one for the finger, one for the arm, with values for each performance  type. 
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the bharatanatyam spectators were the most inconsistent  ones. As noted above, the 
ballet  spectators were more experienced than the bharatanatyam spectators. Hence, 
the objective raters’ outcome supported the information  we gained for the qualitative 
audience research. 
 
 
Conclusions: situating experience across disciplines 
 
 
“All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from 
my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without 
which the symbols of science would be meaningless” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 
p. ix). 
 
In this paper, we have mapped  parts of our experiences to date in combining 
different epistemological  and methodological   approaches in  our exploration  of 
spectators’  responses to watching  dance. This process requires  openness to each 
researcher’s  position at the same time as being  grounded  in our own disciplines, 
combining the readiness  and skill  to perform ‘grand  jetés’  across  disciplinary 
boundaries with core strength and balance. 
Generally, neuroscience works within a paradigm which values simplified  stimuli, 
precision,  and statistically significant results that should be  valid for a  wider 
population.  Phenomenologically  based audience research values more open-ended 
exploration and rich data situated  culturally, historically, and/or socially. This 
contrast could make neuroscience seem conclusive and fixed, though we have found 
that this is not always  the case,  and we value Merleau–Ponty’s  statement, cited 
above, which acknowledges the grounding of all knowledge in lived experience. 
By letting neither neuroscience nor audience research methodology  take primacy 
over the other, but by working bi-directionally, we have deepened understanding  of 
how audience  members  respond  to  watching dance.  The neuroscientific  data 
indicated that empathic abilities  enhance cortical excitability for mimed everyday 
hand actions,  while visual experience  enhances cortical excitability for formal— 
stylised—movements,  such as performed in ballet. The outcomes of the qualitative 
research, where responses from spectators who enjoyed the performance more also 
indicated stronger levels of kinesthetic and empathetic engagement, lend weight  to 
the argument  that kinesthetic  empathy is connected  with spectators’  pleasure  in 
watching  dance (see Reason and Reynolds  2010).  Also, although the neuroscience 
doesn’t tell us about conscious experience and qualitative  research doesn’t tell us 
anything  about the brain, the fact that the experienced  ballet spectators  showed 
distinctive characteristics  in both the neuroscience  and qualitative   research may 
indicate connections or at least commensurability  between conscious experience and 
its ‘neural substrates’ which merit further exploration. 
The interactive approach further provided insights into the other’s methodologies 
and fostered exploration of ways in which the other discipline and their results could 
be applied  in our own discipline. For instance, the questionnaire  used to correlate 
empathy  scores with cortex excitability in cognitive  neuroscience highlighted  that 
the qualitative   research does not use  such  a tool, but the results  have informed 
qualitative  discussions  of  how kinesthetic   response  relates  to  empathy.  The 
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qualitative  researchers have also introduced  a quantitative  aspect to their research by 
developing  a questionnaire  in conversation with the neuroscientists aimed to further 
understanding of audiences’ motivations, which will be posted online and distributed 
at theatres, and will be analysed quantitatively.  In the other direction,  it emerged 
through the interviews  that there were significant  differences in the extent to which 
audience members focused on certain parts of the body, e.g. legs and feet/arms and 
upper body. Exploring the reasons  for this is likely to prove a  fruitful area  of 
investigation for cognitive neuroscience. 
We  are  learning to value contrasting   aspects of each  other’s  fields, and to 
challenge fixed conceptions.  Rather than eliminating disciplinary differences,  we 
aim to advance knowledge  and understanding  of the other position (e.g. through 
reading each other’s work, reading material across disciplines,  and even training  in 
aspects of each other’s research methodologies).  Flexibility on both sides is required 
to achieve  these aims,  including challenging  our methodological   approaches by 
considering  new ways of thinking via collaboration (Moran  2010, p. 181). For 
instance,  the dance performances  for  the  TMS   experiments  and  qualitative 
interviews  stretched  the parameters  of the TMS procedures  in the direction of 
empirical neuroscience  stimuli, but also required  acceptance of deviation from 
‘normal’ theatre conditions for the audience researchers. There may be the risk here 
of compromising at both ends  and thus being open to critique from within our 
chosen disciplines about the rigour of our methods. However, without this flexibility 
we would not be able to collaborate and communicate across different  disciplinary 
approaches. 
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